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## THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005

REPUBLIC 7-5932

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January 28, 1978

Dear Admiral Turner,

The members of the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs are very grateful to you for your highly interesting speech at our luncheon meeting. Both your presentation and your candid answers to questions received a most favorable response.

I believe that such discussions are profitable to us all. Many of our members were also pleased at the opportunity to meet and talk with you personally.

Please accept our warm thanks for taking time from your busy life to be with us and giving us the benefit of your insight and judgment.

All good wishes to you.

Sincerely,

*Loy W. Henderson*  
Loy W. Henderson  
Chairman of the Board

*Dear Stan,*  
*Many thanks for your outstanding presentation and for one of the finest question periods we have had to date.* *Sam*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
McLean, Virginia 20505

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DCI -

FYI. They expect  
an audience of 70 or so.  
Ret'd gov't, lawyers  
and business. George  
and Benie will  
accompany you.

V/Resy  
John

25 JAN 1978

OFFICERS

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Admiral Standfield Turner  
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Admiral--

25-16 MK

The Institute is looking forward to lunch with you at the Cosmos Club on Wednesday next, January 15th. We hope you can join us shortly after 12 when we'll be meeting over cocktails, but your aide reports that you may not be able to join us until 15 to 20 minutes later. If you can make the noon hour, please do, for our members hope to meet our guest personally in that period.

In view of your busy schedule we will sit down for lunch about 12:25. General Lemnitzer will introduce you very briefly over coffee about 12:55 and we hope you can talk to us about the problems of intelligence in a democracy for 20 to 30 minutes, then field questions for another half hour until about 2 or 2:10 p.m. We will, of course, adjust our schedule to yours and General Lemnitzer, as chairman, will certainly warn questioners to be brief.

We welcome any guests you care to bring, but our meetings are otherwise limited to the membership and everything said at our meeting --formally or informally, in your talk or in answer to questions, at the cocktail time or at your table-- is off the record.

I'll be waiting for you and your guests from 12 o'clock on in the Cosmos Club main lobby, front entrance on Massachusetts Avenue --No. 2121 at the corner of Florida Avenue.

Look forward to seeing you and thanks for joining us.

Yours -

Charles S. Foltz, Jr.  
January 19, 1978

*Charles S. Foltz, Jr.*

Admiral Turner's Address to the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs - COSMOS Club, Washington, D.C.  
Wednesday, 25 January 1978

Thank you General Lemnitzer. I think you could have in pointed out I was in the class of '47 and graduated in 46' which gives me credit for completing the four-year course in three years. Maybe he knows that 820 of my other classmates did the same thing!

I'm very happy to be here today, but I think Charley is probably, after some of the rumors that are running around town, even happier! Seriously, yesterday was a big day for the Intelligence Community of this country. I don't take any credit, nor can Charley or the General, for the coincidence of this timing because the one event, signing of the Executive Order, was totally unpredictable up till the end. But it is an important document and I believe the importance of it comes from the fact that there is a general recognition in the government today that we are at a turning point--an important stage in the history of intelligence in our country. After several years of turmoil and criticism, we are now trying to turn the corner onto a very positive direction, but a very unique and modern and American direction in intelligence. Let me try this morning, this afternoon, to describe that direction in terms of an analogy with a great American institution--the family business.

I think the stage at which we are in American Intelligence is analogous to a family business that's gone along very

successfully for 20 or 30 years and has finally decided that the time has come to incorporate.

Well now American intelligence is at about that stage in my view. Because with the business, it incorporates frequently because after a number of years that very successful original product needs modification and the product line needs diversification and you go public under these circumstances. Our product line started out with the OSS, and in the wake of World War II it focused almost exclusively in the first years on the Soviet Union. Maybe some on the satellite countries in Eastern Europe and maybe some on those particular instances when the Soviets made forays out into the rest of the world and tried to establish footholds. But basically, our product was determined by what the Soviets were up to and where they were up to it and the focus was primarily on military intelligence. There was one other characteristic of it that we cannot overlook. That's the fact that the country in those days, particularly with respect to the CIA, asked not only for information and intelligence on what was going on in these forays the Soviets were making here and there, but they asked for influence, for affect upon those events--political action conducted by the CIA. We were there in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Cuba, Vietnam, and as recently as 1975 in Angola until the Congress decided otherwise. Many of you know much more than I do about these events.

But let me suggest today as we look out on a world scene that it is quite different. We are not interested primarily in the Soviet Union and the half a dozen other countries neighboring it. We have intense and genuine and legitimate interest in almost all the 150-odd countries in the world. Those interests stretch from the military to the political to the broad economic questions of the day. Let me disabuse one thing, and threat must remain our number one priority and consideration in American intelligence. But we must also fill these vast other needs. Why it was only four or five years ago that we began predicting the Soviet grain harvest. Look at the change that this brings to the Intelligence process; the different kinds of people we must have; the different kinds of analyses; the different kinds of tools of collection and so on. So it is a period of change. And characterized also by the different attitude throughout the country on the question of political action. Now I do not say we should not have political action today but I say that the tenor is that we should be more judicious and under tighter controls in the execution of political influence. But we must retain that capability for those places where it is applicable. So this is a change of product to me. We have a different product today to the extent that it has a wider sphere of interest--economic, political and military; a greater geographical scope and more focus on the collection of intelligence information rather than on political action deriving there from.

Now, a second reason a family business may turn public is that it's production line itself is outmoded, the equipment just doesn't meet the times anymore. The owners have to go find capital in order to put in modern machinery. We have some astounding modern machinery in the intelligence world today. Technical collection systems that are just burgeoning in capabilities. I would liken it in some ways if you are going out next summer and watering your flowers with a garden hose (being done for us today) and then suddenly finding instead of a garden hose you had a fire hose in your hand, or maybe even a water main. That's the difference over the last decade in the quantity of data, quantity of information, that's available to intelligence through advanced technical collection systems. And that must change our product line, production line; it must change the way we do our business. Now interestingly one of the things that does, is increase the importance of the human intelligence agent. There have been human spies, inside the walls of Jericho before they blew the trumpets, and they have been around ever since and they always will be. And, today there are of growing importance because the more technical data we collect and we offer up to our policy makers, the more often we are asked the question, "You are telling me what happened yesterday, this technical information is telling me what the status is today--what is it going to be tomorrow?", "Why did they

do that?" "What are their intentions?" This as you appreciate is the forte of the human intelligence agent. So the difference in our production line today is simply that we must meld this growing capability to collect raw data with the increased requirement thereof to answer these questions that come out of it through the use of the human intelligence collector. But that is a change in production style. The human agent is no longer the primary intelligence tool; probably the first among equals but one in a galaxy of stars. That too, like changing the product, is something of an unsettling process. It is a ferment in the organization which has to be adjusted to and it is taking time to do.

Still a third reason that private businesses go public is simply that when you change both your product and your production line you sometimes need different kinds of human talent. The old family tradition of taking in Uncle Joe or cousin Bill doesn't quite do when you've got sophisticated new computer systems and others in which people must be particularly trained. Maybe you've even got a staff, enough to do the job, but not the right kind for your new production line. So too, particularly in the Central Intelligence Agency today, we have to re-tool, in my opinion, our personnel policies away from the family business concept to the public corporation concept. We've been blessed in this country for thirty years with some of the finest most dedicated intelligence officers--professionals who came in the organization in its early years at the height



of the Cold War and have dedicated and sacrificed and achieved ever since. Let me give you a little statistic. We have this four top grades of government payroll, GS-15, 16, 17, and 18 and four top levels of Vice Presidents in our corporation. Today the average age in the Central Intelligence Agency of officers in the GS-15, 16, 17, and 18 bracket differed by only 3 years; and at the GS-15,16,17 bracket by only one year. They are all 50 years old. GS-18s are 53--that's on the average. But to spread around that average there is about three years. The average retirement age is 52 and I'm talking now about the clandestine service of this CIA. We are going to have problems in a few years. A different problem than a public corporation or the family business has. Because if in business half the vice presidents retire in 2 or 3 years, what do you do? You go out on the market, you find other people who are in similar corporations and you bring them in. But where do I turn to get an experienced chief of station, a professional spy. I have to raise them from within. To do that, we must have a promotion and progression policy that lets us be in a situation such as when I must assign a man to a sensitive, risk-taking post for this country that I have 3 or 4 choices to be sure that we have exactly the right one. But this isn't a family business with tenure. This is a business where you have to be competitive internally. Or you have to make provisions for the good people to be identified, selected and moved along so

that when you bring them into those top positions they've had the grooming, they've had the experience and we have to do that. It is one of the reasons I had the unpleasant task on the 1st of November of asking 212 of our employees to leave, 2/3 of them to retire. I didn't like that. But I thought it had to be done for the health, the future, of the clandestine portion of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Now then, let's take the analogy one step further. Family businesses are private. Public corporations gradually move into the limelight. And so too in intelligence today in our country, after the number of years of investigation and inquiry, there is no way we can avoid our intelligence community being more in the public limelight. It has disadvantages, particularly as you are all well aware, the KGB doesn't have that same kind of spot light on it. But it also has advantages. Look back, look back to December 1975 when all the criticism and inquiry started. Had the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular, had more understanding and support in the country, it might not have taken the battery for many of the things it did which were quite unjust, uncalled for, even malicious in my opinion. So today we hope that we can gain better understanding with the American public and through it greater support. I'm not suggesting in any way that in the intelligence business you can go public. You can release some information and there are others that you must absolutely withhold. Some of the things we do cannot be done if they're not done in secrecy as you are well aware. I've been working in two directions

in recent months. Almost a draconian measure tightening security of how we get our intelligence, what these technical systems are, how the human agents work and the most sensitive information that they obtain, but on the other hand, opening up where we can afford to open up. Whenever we complete a major study, a major estimate, we look at it today and say, if we take out that which must remain classified, is there enough corpus left to be of benefit to the American public. If there is, we want to make it available. And we have done that, I believe with good service to the country in recent months. For instance, I hope that we have stimulated some interesting and some worthwhile debates in this country over the world energy situation; over the Soviet economic forecast that we've made and made public. I hope that these are helping to improve that quality of national debate. I don't believe in doing these, we have released anything that would be of great succor to the enemy.

Finally, let me suggest that when that family business goes public it's also suddenly subject to much greater oversight from its board of directors and to some extent from the public itself. And so too, with American intelligence today. Out of this crucible of criticism has come a process of oversight. I've overstated it, it has not come, it's coming, it's partly here, it's not fully here. The Executive Order yesterday was part of it. My board of directors is, of course, the President, the Vice President, and National Security

Council, the Intelligence Oversight Board and two committees of the Congress. I call these surrogates for public oversight. Because as we all appreciate there is no way in which you could have totally public oversight of an intelligence process.

Today we are reporting more completely, more frequently than ever before to these oversight people and organizations. And it is working well. The Congress is proving trustworthy and it is benefitting us first because we are staying closer in touch with the American sentiment, the American people through this contact with the Congress. Secondly, because we are benefitting by some outside judgement and view of the risks we are taking in the things we are doing. Thirdly, we are frankly sharing the responsibility for those risks and when you start seeing Senators and Representatives feeling the weight of that responsibility on their shoulders they become much more responsible than one would anticipate in terms of security. They become quite security conscious. It's quite different to leak a politically useful piece of information and one that's damaging to the national strategy and security.

But let me say that as all of these steps are taking place in this evolution of a family-type business to a public corporation, it is unsettling. People are waiting to see just how it will settle out. Our relations with the Oversight bodies, for instance, are not fully settled yet and it will be another year or two. But yesterday we laid the foundation for that

and for moving in the directions I have pointed out by this Executive Order which has three cardinal features: The first is that it attempts to ensure the intimate involvement in the establishment of what we should be doing in intelligence by the policy makers and by the Chairman of the Subcommittee of the National Security Council to do this. But clearly I am not the one to set the priorities for collecting intelligence because I'm not a consumer. I'm here to provide them that service. So I chair this committee and draw out from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Treasury, and National Security Council advisors to the President, what they need and what they want and what their priorities are. This has been attempted before in other forms and other committees and we'll have to see if it works in this one. But I can assure you we are determined to make it work and we have high level attention and interest to it and this committee has been functioning for months in advance of the actual signing yesterday and it's been most helpful to me.

Secondly, the Executive Order strengthens the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence in a number of areas. Essentially this is nothing more than an attempt to really go back to the National Security Act of 1947 which tried to establish a centralized authority over intelligence. It never quite worked that way and we're not going to a full czar of intelligence as the newspapers have desisively called me. And there is no intent or hope for that. But what it has done

is that for the first time the Director of Central Intelligence will have clear authority to formulate the overall National Foreign Intelligence Program budget. He's to be chairman of a committee and I needn't tell you the difference between being the boss and being the chairman of a committee. We put the budget together for 1979 by this new process again in anticipation of the signing of the order. I think it works splendidly and it did not tend to denigrate the interests of the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury, or anybody else. We had a very good meeting of the minds exchange of views before the final decisions were made and the budget presented to the OMB and the President.

Thirdly, it strengthens my authority over what we call tasking--tasking of the collection elements of the Intelligence Community, whether they be housed in the Department of Defense or elsewhere. In short, the expensive, the risk taking portion of intelligence is collecting and here we don't want excessive overlap. Here we cannot afford underlap. Here we must also anticipate from a broad community viewpoint what is needed today, 5--10 years from now and prepare for it. This extra control, which I now have, to ensure that all the collection elements, human and technical, are under my direction and control--no matter who is actually operating them--I think will give us that. It does not--going back to the term czar--give me the authority to ride roughshod over people's opinions about what the intelligence data means when collected. The Bureau of Intelligence & Research, Tom Hughes headed up, is

just as independent today as it was then and so is the Defense Intelligence Agency. We want overlap; we want divergent views to come forward on the production; the analysis side of the house. We are not looking for these economies there because there are neither the risks nor the large costs. Finally, it gives me the authority to ensure the proper dissemination of the information collected. We all are aware in many instances in which one agency has collected something; given it out to some of its consumers but failed to think of somebody else. I now have centralized authority to ensure that dissemination takes place and if I do it well.

And finally, the third cardinal area of change is in the oversight and control areas. They're getting more publicity in the press than they deserve, because the changes aren't that dramatic. Some of it was erroneously reported this morning. But there are established here, to follow on with the Executive Order that was in existence that was signed by President Ford February 76, procedures by which particularly operations that could infringe in the rights and privacy of American citizens are controlled. It is true as cited in the press the method of that control has largely been through guidelines which will be established by the Attorney General. We will work with them--saying these are the rules we can live with--these are the rules that are needed to protect the citizen and we will work out a set

of policies under which we must operate. That's the Executive Order. The last step in the whole process will be the development of legislative charters by the committees of the Congress. They are going to table their first draft of that next week. We will, I think, for many months be working that out, negotiating between ourselves and the various committees and bodies of the Congress. And over the next year or so we will then have codified some of the executive order regulations, some other regulations and we will have settled down into a process which I think will be exciting, capable but new and uniquely American. I'm bullish for the prospects and look forward to the questions to see if I can elaborate in any way.

Thank you.



Q: The Commission felt that one of the best surveillance groups, I'm not sure that this is the right term, one of the best advisory groups in the government was the so called PFIAB I was wondering why you saw fit to do away with that Board when the time you came into your present position?

A: I think it is just an amendment. I didn't see fit to do away with it. The President did and as the ...servant I don't disclose whether I support that or didn't support it in my debate with him. I think that would be unfair to him. But I believe the rationale behind not to continue the PFIAB was really that we have so much more oversight in this process I am describing today than existed before. Now if you go back to the history of the PFIAB Clark Clifford recommended that PFIAB originally in a way of staving off Congressional Committees of intelligence. We now have those and each of those not only looks into oversight in terms of legality and propriety but has a specific subcommittee to look into the quality and the type of product that we're doing the kinds of things that PFIAB did do. Now I admit to you that these committees did not have the Edward Tellers and real technical expertise that PFIAB had acquired over the years. But at the same time that kind of specific helpful talent is available I have two scientific technical advisory bodies who report or come in and consult once a quarter with me and so on. So I believe I'm getting the technical advice on that side and the objective review of the quality of our work through these other oversight mechanisms primarily the subcommittee on evaluation of intelligence of the two basic committees.

Q: On that question,....public support.....three muskateers in the White House.....I wonder whether they are giving you support in that part of the public.....  
....fully supporting the Intelligence Community as a whole in our generation today. ....help you I am asking the question with timidity.....  
.....

A: When I came to Washington in 1963 for duty in..... Assistant to Analyses you all know were called the whiz kids I was 40 or something at the time and I called myself a whiz fud! I arrived one day and I walked in the office and they said "This will be your office but there is somebody else in it now and he's a summer intern from Amherst and his

named turned to be John Dutch and I had to wait a couple of weeks for John to go back to Amherst before I got a desk. But to answer your question - it is more difficult in some ways for the two select committees on intelligence to stand up and push our banner forward because they all have the role of being objective oversight people. They are doing that and because they do have that oversight process it gives some added credibility to them. I can't say they are as strong as....PFIAB was in the old days. But I find them supportive. But just let me give a very specific example. Yesterday morning in the newspaper I was going to be fired. I went to the House Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday and every member I testified for made a preface or followed his questions to me with some .... comments about my performance. I don't think that they really thought I was doing that well they wanted publicly to go on record they were supporting me. I think that was very very helpful and very nice of them and I was most appreciative. They will do that. So I hope and trust that we'll have support here we seek.

Q; You mentioned that the political action was going to be significantly diminished. Is there any way you can give us a sorta of a percent of the total CIA work formerly and in the future as far as it looks like.

A: Frankly, no. But it is much reduced. Of course, in Vietnam we were very very big in the paramilitary operations out there. It had to take a large number of our resources. Today, ask yourself if you wanted to influence a situation in any one of the countries that is having major elections in the next year or two. What would you do. You know that or at least there are stories, I haven't checked them all, that leaves the country through the CIA help democratically inclined....in political elections in some foreign countries in years past. I suspect today if you went to some of those same parties in those same countries have said would you like a half a million dollars to finance your election campaign. You might get turned down. Not necessarily because of fear that it would leak in the U.S. and there would be that fear but it might leak inside the country and it might lose you votes rather than gain. In short, I think the opportunities are less. But we keeping our paramilitary edge. We're keeping hard core people and equipment. We're keeping the other tools of political action sharpened. We do have on-going political action today. It's limited. We have started a new political action during the Carter

Administration. There's no shying away from it when it is appropriate. And every time we get into a national problem in some part of the world I turn to the paramilitary covert action people of the Central Intelligence Agency and I say develop me a short piece of paper of what you could do for us. And I stick it in my pocket and I go to the National Security Council for meetings and I sorta hold it there. I want to be prepared. Cy Vance and Harold Brown said we need help over here. I've got the plan. I know the limits of what we can do. Sometimes of course there are no volunteers. I think it is really useful. We are not unwilling to look at it. But let me say I've reached in my pocket to bring it out very seldom and not because I thought there would be a rejection or concern that it shouldn't be done. It is because I wasn't sure that what I had in my pocket was really going to be very effective on the particular circumstances we've been facing. We are ready to go if called upon.

Q; I want to ask you a personal question, Stan. How do you spend your time. You've been in the job for a year. The demand must be kind of..... the public, the Congress, the oversight..... From an ideal point of view a job description how would you weigh the advantages.....what would you like to do more of or for that matter what would you like to do less of?

A: I'd like to do less tangling over detailed wording of executive orders. All that you have been through the bureaucratic process of hammering out changes to an organization. I'd like to do less of that and I think I'm now at that point that it will be less. I frankly would like to have to concern myself less the so-called morale of the Central Intelligence Agency. But these unsettling changes of personnel policies, product and production line have require that people be tended to. Reassured and explained to. It takes time and effort. But it's a necessary thing in any organization to look at your people but it is more time demanding today than I think it would be four or five months. I'd like to spend much more time on the analytic side of the house. I'd like to spend more time preparing for those Presidential briefings. I consider it one of my critical things that I've privileged that the President ....gives my time as he does. I've got to utilize it every instance of it well. I think that's the principle area that I'd like to spend more time. No, the second principle area is ensuring that in this new tasking authority gets off the ground well. Because that's going to be the cohesiveness in the Community and I am encouraged that in the months

The President  
since last August///who made the decision on this  
shape of this organization I've seen that cohesiveness  
I've seen the leaders or the other intelligence  
organization outside the CIA asking for guidance and  
direction and wanted to be part of the team. I think  
that it is very important that if this ~~Agency~~/  
executive order is going to work well in the next  
few years that I give a great deal of my time to  
ensuring that true team work does develop. You  
can't under these type of circumstances ride rough-  
shod over these other agencies that are not under  
my total control would expect to have and again  
team work and that's what I expect to have.

Q: Under the .....do you retain responsibility for  
access of sources and methods on intelligence? And  
if so,.....

A: Yes, I do retain that now. It's in the law and  
I'm going to be very hard nose that it must say  
in the law when they re-do it here ~~that if I know~~ I don't know if  
there is any effort to take it out but I think  
it is essential authority or responsibility of the  
Director of Central Intelligence. There is no question  
that today when you have to disclose war through  
oversight there are greater risks to sources and methods  
in collecting intelligence. No doubt today and I suppose  
every administration goes through this we seem to be  
in a wave of leakage. I hope that will stop soon.  
but fortunately it's not ~~much leakage~~ as much leakage  
that really effects intelligence sources and methods.  
Some have and some serious. There is an awful  
lot of discussing of the on-going point papers that  
are being generated in the National Security Council  
and places that it is injurious to the country but  
not to this particular function. I have to hope and  
believe we will find the right compromise between  
too much oversight and too much risk of disclosure  
and not enough oversight which will lead to uncertainty  
in the public as to what we are doing. I have confidence  
that we are going to get there.

Q: Your point about....of information.....your point  
analyses is very well stated. Many years ago when  
...Smith and Adm. Dulles came into the Agency they  
orgainzed something called the office of national  
estimates.....Now the office of National estimates  
.....national intelligence estimates process a way  
of moving ahead was probably not ideal but.....  
as having served the President and the Director very  
well indeed.. I've never really understood why the  
....and the national intelligence estimate process  
otherwords the standard.....I've never quite understood  
how it's substitute works.

A: Dick Helms could answer that better than I could. But my understanding is that and this is somewhat an analogis in PFIAB it was the National Intelligence Office was a wonderful idea and it worked beautifully. They left too many of the people stay on there indefinitely and then they left some people come in who weren't first class who they needed to find places for and so on. But it was changed and they created something called the National Intelligence Officers who were 26 - 27 people who sat with the regional or function responsibilities to prepared the national estimates.

Q: I'd like to protect myself I did not.....

A: It was Bill Colby. I'm sorry Dick you know about it as much as I do but you could do it. Very quickly one of the first things I wanted to do was go back in that direction because I agree with you and I liked it from what I knew of it from the outside. And what Bob Bowie and I are doing is we still have a national intelligence officer but we are creating a group of 30 - 40 outside consultants and we are going to call on 2 or 3 of those for each national estimate. We are going to pick them carefully and probably one who does know anything about the subject so we got a man who will see the woods for the trees and one who is a hawk or a dove or one who is a hawk if we've got all doves or one who is a dove if we have all hawks. Or one who is a missile expert if we're a little short in that side are are better in torpedos or whatever it may be. In short, we'll have this stable sitting on the back 40 out there to pull in and help give us a kind of balance that the national estimate office did.

Q: Is there anything being done to try to improve sharing information abroad? Have more sharing of information between embassies and Station chiefs and less duplication.

A: Yes sir. Cy Vance and I several months ago signed what's known as the new State/CIA treaty and it strengthens the hands of the ambassador in the countries team direction of the intelligence function of his country. In order for the station chiefs to share more but not everything with him. As long as it is not everything there will always be a little irritant with the ambassadors. My statutory responsibility General Taylor pointed out inhibits me from sharing absolutely everything. But I think that it can be a very small part that isn't in this treaty so-called has been well received so far from both the CIA side of the house and the

ambassador's side. The objective is to get closer team work there and let the ambassador know who we are and we are working with him. Let him know when we are doing sensitive things in his country and make sure that we are working in the same direction. I'm counting on the concessions I made in that direction for the ambassadors to develop greater team work with us and mightly in the process.

A: For decades the Academic community has made contributions to the Intelligence Community.....  
What's being done....

Q: I could not agree with you more and if I don't answer your question fully in the next 30 seconds when the meeting is over please come up and meet Professor Jim King at the table here whom I asked to join me in the Central Intelligence Agency the first few weeks I was there and his sole responsibility is to improve relations with the academic community in this country. I feel most strongly about that. I had been chopping at the bit with my lawyers to get into Defense to Professor Gilmer or whatever his name is at Brooklyn College they have advised me I may hurt him more if I help him or I stayed out of it. I've charged off and wanted to go to Cornell and go on the campus and let them throw tomatoes at me if they have to to stand up for the rights of Prof. Seltzer who is working with us not to be criticized on his own campus for doing it. I think you are going to be the ones who help us on this one because obviously I don't carry that weight with the academic community because of my bias position. I have neogtiated with.....Bock at Harvard. I'm open to neogiation with any university that's about to put out guidelines like Harvard's. I strongly object, Eric Bock knows it, to his singling out the Intelligence Community, if he wants to place an order and.....at Amherst has one, and I don't object to Amherst because it simply saids anybody in this faculty who has outside ~~interests~~ income from any organization must report it to the Administration or maybe it's not income, connection - work. That's a problem for the faculty and the administration as far as I am concerned and I don't object. Harvard just saids only if you have it with the Intelligence Community and I say that living in the land of the witch hunts you ought not to do that. You ought to remember better what it is to discriminate against any group in your society.

